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Abstract 
Sports betting products rely upon a balance between their knowledge and chance based structural 
characteristics. The emphasis by bookmakers on mastering the knowledge-based elements to become 
winners poses significant challenges for those seeking help for gambling disorder. Bettors find difficulties 
in integrating their preconceptions about the role of knowledge and skills in winning into the new 
cognitive restructuring fostered by cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). Using a grounded theory 
approach, this study collected data from 43 Spanish sports bettors undergoing treatment for gambling 
disorder. The results suggest sports bettors neutralise some gambling-related cognitive distortions during 
CBT but retain others. Sports bettors try to eliminate them but encounter external validation to retain 





Individuals seeking treatment for gambling disorder have historically reported fast and high event 
frequency games (e.g., slot machines) as their most prevalent mode of gambling (Harris & Griffiths, 
2018; Petry, 2003), although many times different gambling forms co-occur. This situation has begun to 
change in the last decade, partially due to the structural modifications (e.g., in-play betting) that the 
internet brought upon gambling product design (Griffiths, Wardle, Orford, Sproston, & Erens, 2009), but 
also by other situational transformations such as greater availability and accessibility, and more detailed 
legal frameworks in multiple jurisdictions across the globe (Lopez-Gonzalez & Griffiths, 2016). Among 
the gambling products that have benefited from such transformation is sports betting, which has 
experienced a large growth in many territories while other forms of gambling have stagnated or declined 
(Gainsbury et al., 2015). Betting on sports is increasingly being referred to by treatment-seeking gamblers 
as their most prevalent mode of gambling in Australia (Hing, Russell, Gainsbury, & Blaszczynski, 2015), 
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and is also rising rapidly in Spain, where the present study was conducted (Directorate General for the 
Regulation of Gambling, 2017).  
 
The way gambling products are designed (i.e., their structural characteristics) has a strong influence on 
how gamblers perceive such products and their ability to win with them (Parke & Griffiths, 2007; Schüll, 
2012). Sports betting differs from other gambling products such as lottery, most slot machines, roulette, 
and bingo, in that it is structured as a combination of skills and chance, similar to poker and blackjack, 
and other forms of betting. This combination encourages bettors to overestimate the role their own sports 
knowledge plays in securing winnings, while making some individuals underestimate how significant the 
role of chance is, and is something further reinforced by sports betting advertising stimuli (Lopez-
Gonzalez, Estévez, & Griffiths, 2018a).  
 
However, statistical simulations repeatedly indicate that, irrespective of the bettors’ perceived or actual 
skills, sports betting does not provide long-term opportunities to profit for a vast majority of bettors 
(Budimir & Jelaska, 2017). This is especially true when bettors follow the supposedly attractive 
marketing enticements promoted by bookmakers, which often entail a larger overround (i.e., profit 
margin for bookmakers) (Newall, 2015; 2018). Furthermore, for some gamblers, it is difficult to decipher 
whether they are making a profit or not because some gambling designs disguise losses as wins, and 
distort the gamblers’ perception of their net winnings, ignoring that multiple gross wins might still equate 
to a net loss, a situation that often occurs in sports betting contexts (Jensen et al., 2013). 
 
The balance of knowledge versus chance 
The design of a gambling product in terms of its balance of knowledge/skills versus chance is paramount 
to understand how gamblers perceive it. The greater the skills involved in a game are, the more significant 
the cognitive biases associated with being a skilful gambler are likely to be (Griffiths, 1994). Studies have 
found that heavy gamblers exhibit more cognitive distortions and biases in skill games than in non-skill 
games (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997). Data from the Norwegian 
national survey on gambling habits showed that among high frequency gamblers, less skilled-based 
games (e.g., bingo cards, slot machines) showed more irrational thinking, perhaps because these games 
have structural characteristics that encourage superstitious thinking while more skills-based games 
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involved more knowledge-based cognitive distortions (Lund, 2011). In this regard, the illusion of control 
has been found to be more associated with skill-based games than non-skill games (Stark, 2014). 
Qualitative studies examining the role of knowledge in gambling have been relatively rare. However, 
Ohtsuka (2013) conducted a study with 49 poker machine players and reported that those gamblers with 
secondary education (or lower) thought poker to be a game of luck more often than college-educated 
gamblers who believed more in strategic approaches to gambling.  
 
Beliefs that knowledge and skills play a part in successful gambling are present in both problem and non-
problem gamblers. As Stark (2014) noted, cognitive biases, the gambler’s fallacy, and the illusion of 
control are common to all the pathways theorised in the integral pathways model of problem gambling 
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002), which means they almost always play a role in developing the disorder. 
However, problem gamblers resort more often to luck than non-problem gamblers (which is viewed by 
them as a personal characteristic), as well as magical thinking as explanatory mechanisms of game 
outcomes (Teed, Finlay, Marmurek, Colwell, & Newby-Clark, 2012). Similarly, problem gamblers tend 
to be more irrational in their perceptions, as indicated by stronger beliefs in the role of skilful play in 
chance activities, and that gambling is a potentially profitable activity (Delfabbro, Lahn, & Grabosky, 
2006). Similar results were found in a study with Norwegian gamblers (Myrseth, Brunborg, & Eidem, 
2010), in which problem gamblers reported more cognitive distortions than non-problem gamblers. Also, 
those who played skill-based games had more cognitive distortions than those only playing chance-based 
games. A telephone survey with young adults in Australia showed that skill-based gambling activities 
were more associated with problem gambling than chance-based activities, perhaps because individuals 
gamble more money when they feel more confident in their control over the outcome (Boldero & Bell, 
2012).  
 
In the specific case of sports betting, the balance of knowledge/skills versus chance is arguably further 
skewed towards the overestimation of the impact of knowledge, with some structural characteristics of 
online sports betting facilitating it (Lopez-Gonzalez, Estévez, & Griffiths, 2018b). Sports bettors, like 
other gamblers, see their gambling reinforced when they receive group membership or praise as rewards 
for participating in gambling (Raylu & Oei, 2002). Gambling on sports has been found to be a form of 
bragging, by which bettors demonstrate to peers their knowledge about sports and their ability to prevail 
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over other member groups (Deans, Thomas, Daube, & Derevensky, 2016; Gordon, Gurrieri, & Chapman, 
2015). In addition, some gamblers who engage in skill-based gambling such as sports betting see 
themselves as professional gamblers, who with training and game data analysis, can convert gambling 
into a career path (Hing, Russell, Gainsbury, & Blaszczynski, 2016). 
 
The challenges for therapy of skill-based gambling 
Irrational beliefs and cognitions are context-bound, and are more likely to occur in environments that 
promote such cognitive distortions (Delfabbro, 2004). Gamblers seeking treatment for sports betting-
related harm present many of the common symptoms associated with gambling disorder, but also have 
some idiosyncrasies related to skill-based games. A systematic review of studies utilizing cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) treatments conducting cognitive restructuring among problem gamblers 
showed that the growth of help-seeking individuals gambling on skill-based games created a challenge for 
therapists. These individuals presented a distinct gambler profile and different patterns of cognition than 
primarily chance-based problem gamblers (Chrétien, Giroux, Goulet, Jacques, & Bouchard, 2017). In the 
particular case of sports betting, gamblers arguably resort to a more biased thinking pattern to enhance 
their sense of control and winning probability when they have an emotional involvement with that 
gambling form, as it happens in the sentimental bonds nurtured between bettors and their teams and/or 
athletes. A reference would help here – I think we mentioned something similar in one of our papers on 
advertising appealing to gamblers supporting their teams 
 
It has been broadly accepted that a greater emphasis on rationally dismantling gambling-related cognitive 
biases (e.g., teaching mathematical skills) would equate to adolescents being less likely inclined to 
irrational thoughts about gambling. This assumption has not proved to be entirely correct (Benhsain & 
Ladouceur, 2004). Knowing about mathematics reduces cognitive biases, even after six months, but does 
not modify gambling behaviour (Williams & Connolly, 2006). Delfabbro et al. (2006) argued that the 
pathway to cognitive biases in young people does not depend on objective and factual information about 
odds or probabilities but about their own attitudes towards gambling. This is also the case in adults. 
Among adults, gamblers are not less knowledgeable on mathematics and other skills than non-gamblers, 
emphasizing the necessity of focusing on different aspects of the CBT to address their cognitive 
distortions (Fortune & Goodie, 2012). This is very relevant for sports bettors in treatment because, 
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although CBT is sometimes unable to restructure their biased cognitions concerning the importance of 
knowledge about sports to win money in the long run, CBT is still beneficial for them and can provide 
other non-cognitive positive outcomes such as abstinence, reduced exposition to gambling stimuli, and a 
focus shift towards other life interests unrelated to gambling.  
 
The present study explores how sports bettors undergoing treatment for gambling disorder navigate the 
balance of knowledge/skills versus chance inherent to sports betting products. The paper focuses on the 
way bettors make sense of the impact that knowledge/skills (henceforth referred to as ‘knowledge’) has 
on their cognitions about sports betting, and how such knowledge (or lack thereof) contributed to the 
development of their gambling problems. Using a qualitative interview design, the study investigates how 
bettors integrate the newly acquired cognitions from CBT with their pre-existing cognitions about how 
sports betting works and how important knowing about sports is, and the kind of struggles that are 
encountered when trying to integrate both sets of cognitions.   
 
Methods 
Recruitment and data collection 
A total of 43 participants were recruited to participate in seven focus groups (FGs). The research team 
contacted the Federacion Española de Jugadores de Azar Rehabilitados (FEJAR; Spanish Federation of 
Rehabilitated Gamblers), which is the largest nationwide federation of people with gambling disorder in 
Spain. Regional associations pertaining to FEJAR were contacted by email and offered the opportunity to 
participate in the FGs. The call for participants specified that the sole inclusion criterion was that sports 
betting had to be their prevalent gambling activity. Five associations responded to the call for 
participation, and FGs were set up on location, with the first author traveling to their premises between 
April and June 2017. In addition, another FG was held in the pathological gambling unit of a hospital, 
following equivalent criteria of recruitment. All the participants had been diagnosed with gambling 
disorder prior to the study, and were either currently undergoing treatment consisting in CBT or had 
recently completed it. CBT in FEJAR typically consists of 3-5 months of weekly sessions (individual and 
group), plus monthly catch-up sessions until the end of treatment. The diagnosis was based on either the 
NODS (National Opinion Research Center, 1999) or a Spanish adaptation of the DSM-IV criteria 
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(Jiménez-Murcia et al., 2009), as well as in individual interviews with psychologist trained in behavioural 
addictions who confirmed the diagnosis. 
 
Altogether, 43 male participants (no females met the inclusion criteria) comprised seven FGs in six 
different Spanish cities. FG 1 was conducted in Barakaldo, Basque Country region (n=7; Mage = 29.1 
years, SD = 8.13). FG 2 in Vigo, Galicia (n=5; Mage = 31 years, SD = 13.1). FG 3 in Coruña, Galicia 
(n=12; Mage = 34 years, SD = 10.9). FG 4 (n=6; Mage = 36.5 years, SD = 9.1) and FG 5 (n=3; Mage = 31.6 
years, SD = 9.5) in Madrid. FG 6 in Pamplona, Navarre (n=6; Mage = 33.6 years, SD = 8.6). Finally, FG 7 
in Barcelona, Catalonia (n=4; Mage = 36.7 years, SD = 4.3). The mean age for all participants was 33.2 
years (SD = 9.3). All quotes selected in the present paper are accompanied by a participant identifier (e.g., 
‘P6’ refers to ‘Participant 6’). Ethical approval was obtained from the first author’s university in concord 
with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants signed consent forms and were reassured of their rights of 
withdrawal, confidentiality, and anonymity. FGs lasted approximately 90 minutes each and were all 
audiotaped. Participants received a gift with an approximate value of €10 for their contribution to the 
study.   
 
Analytical approach 
The data analysed in this study were part of a larger project using a focus group design of sports bettors 
undergoing treatment for gambling disorder. The broad aim of the project was to understand how sports 
bettors perceived different cultural stimuli that might have spurred their gambling habit and/or 
discouraged discontinuing gambling. These stimuli were specific to sports betting context, and focused on 
the situational and structural characteristics of betting (Parke & Griffiths, 2007), especially those derived 
from the development of new online features to gamble (McCormack & Griffiths, 2013), as opposed to 
the individual characteristics. Among the most prominent cultural stimuli explored were advertising and 
marketing strategies used by bookmakers to promote betting. These strategies guided the questions during 
the focus group conversations. Nevertheless, once the material from the groups was collected, new 
themes – which were not anticipated in the original design of the focus groups – emerged in the analysis.  
 
The analytical examination of the data stemmed from the principles of Grounded Theory (GT), as 
understood by Strauss and Corbin (1998). The research team worked under the assumption that, grounded 
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in the comments made by participants to unrelated questions, new theoretical models could better explain 
the collected data. The coding and interpretation method was structured in a way that the themes 
presupposed in the FG scripts (and thus implied by the questions asked to the participants) would not be 
necessarily the same as the resulting themes obtained after the data analysis. GT allows researchers to 
approach analysis and build theory in an inductive manner, as detached as possible from preconceived 
theorisations about data (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
In the present study, data were explored in repeated cycles to allow immersion, performing stepwise 
consecutive coding methods as proposed by Saldaña (2009). A holistic coding was first performed to 
delineate the data in broad categories. The continuous and circular analysis of the data generated more 
refined themes that departed from the original themes implied in the interview scripts, generating ‘a 
central or core category’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 146). Following this, a new round of coding 
(structural coding) was conducted, specifically structured around the new core category, generating sub-
themes around this core. Extracts that vividly illustrated the theme were also coded at this stage (in vivo 
coding). Finally, once all the data relevant to the proposed theme was recoded, a theoretical coding was 
conducted to check whether the theories put forward aligned well and were effectively grounded in the 
data.   
 
The data were coded using QSR NVivo 10 for Mac. A third-party company was hired to transcribe the 
interviews. Although number of themes initially identified and number of mentions to those themes are 
identified (see Table 1 in next section), the exact number of participants adhering to each theme is not 
reported given the qualitative approach of the study. However, some expressions are used to indicate 
approximate endorsement: ‘most’ (80% of the participants or higher); ‘many’ (50-79%); ‘some’ (20-
49%), and ‘a few’ (19% or below).      
 
Results and preliminary discussion 
 
Overview of themes 
The initial coding of the data (holistic coding) helped identify 50 different themes. These findings are 
summarised in Table 1, which shows how prevalent each theme was in the interviews, and the number of 
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FGs in which they were discussed by participants. Once these themes were outlined, the results were 
considered and discussed among the research team, and a core central theme was proposed based on the 
preponderance of ‘cognitive distortions’. A second cycle of coding (structural) focused on whether other 
themes previously identified in different categories also contributed to the understanding of cognitive 
distortions. At this point, other themes were added (in bold within Table 1) to the ‘cognitive distortions’ 
core theme.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
The inclusion of other themes initially considered to have nothing to do with cognitive distortions was 
guided by theoretical significance (theoretical coding). The theoretical coding posed the major challenge 
in the understanding of the findings of the study. The close and repeated examination of the data covered 
by the themes ‘cognitive distortions’, ‘role of knowledge’, ‘tipsters’, ‘near-miss cognitions’, and 
‘accumulators’ appeared to describe a core central theme that was pre-emptively named as ‘cognitions 
about the role of knowledge versus chance’. This core theme was defined as the process of bettors in 
recovery in making sense of their cognitions and beliefs about how sports betting products worked (their 
design), and their struggle to integrate such cognitions and beliefs with the learning and cognitive 
restructuring involved in CBT.   
 
Abandoned and persistent cognitions: The role of addiction 
Emerging from this redefined core theme, participants covertly manifested two differentiated groups of 
cognitions about sports betting products: (i) abandoned cognitions as an effect of therapy; and (ii) 
persistent cognitions during/after therapy. Abandoned cognitions included uncritical thinking about 
gambling myths or pseudo-facts (e.g., injuries in Euroleague basketball are more determinant than in 
other competitions [P24, 39 years]; predicting breaks of service in women’s tennis is easier than in men’s 
[P38, 24 years]). Also, betting systems that bettors believed to increase their winning probability (e.g., in 
football, wagering that nil-nil draws will conclude with +0.5 goals [P20, 40 years]). Other cognitions 
involved the understanding of probabilities implied by odds as a spectrum instead of a win or lose 




“You get to a point, in my experience, where probability of bets are 50%, it’s either I win or I 
lose, 50%. We now know that probability is one in 99,000, so to speak, but not for me. When I 
was sick, it was I win or I lose. I hit the jackpot or I leave after losing everything” (P36, 41 
years). 
 
However, despite undergoing CBT, a number of latent cognitions regarding the interaction of knowledge 
and chance in sports betting persisted at the time of the interviews. Some bettors were not able to 
acknowledge the inherent imbalance of the bookmaker-bettor relationship, in which bookmakers 
minimize exposition to chance by designing biased odds that give them an edge over consumers in the 
long run regardless of game outcomes. Participants were prone to acknowledge deception in advertising 
(e.g., the difficulties in cashing money from free bonuses, or the exaggeration of welcome bonuses), but 
were reluctant to think that the bookmaker-bettor interaction was not conceived as an equal opportunity 
setting. In essence, this meant that while bettors broadly thought of bookmakers as evil corporations (e.g., 
“nobody gives anything for nothing. They’re giving us free bonuses to make us continue gambling. They 
have it perfectly studied” [P8, 48 years]), they tended to think that the asymmetrical relationship between 
bookmakers and themselves (i.e., the bookmaker winning more frequently than they were) was due to 
something other than the biased betting product design itself.  
 
Such distorted cognitions about betting products manifested in two ways: (i) lack of references to betting 
design favouring bookmakers; and (ii) references to alternative explanations to bookmakers’ greater 
success. Many bettors argued that bookmakers win more because they have access to and manage better 
quality sports information, or because they have more analytical power to predict games. Consistent with 
this view of the equal opportunity setting is the fact some bettors cited acquaintances who had been 
kicked out of betting sites because of their winning record (something bookmakers acknowledge), or a 
few bettors that cited the likely existence of other bettors “who must be making millions” (P38, 24 years). 
Another persistent cognition among a few participants about how betting products work was the winning 
probability attached to long-term betting. Here, a latent confusion appeared to be operating, epitomised in 





“We know that betting every week €100 on FC Barcelona or Real Madrid [currently the two best 
soccer teams in Spain], we’ll win €40, but that’s not what we’re after […] You’ll win more than 
you’ll lose, but stakes must be bigger to make a small profit because odds are short” (P40, 39 
years).  
 
The persistent cognitions and beliefs about the probability of winning involved in betting were sometimes 
associated with the role that gambling disorder played in their gambling behaviour. An underlying 
cognition appeared to emerge after closer examination of data. The basic mental process of this cognition 
is outlined in Figure 1, which visually summarizes the following idea: bettors believe that a successful 
event prediction is the result of a balance between the amount of knowledge one can possess over that 
specific event, and an uncontrollable amount of chance. Among healthy bettors, the balance between 
knowledge versus chance in one hand, and a successful prediction on the other hand, is direct and non-
mediated. However, among those bettors like themselves who suffer an addiction to gambling, this 
relationship is moderated by such addiction. Following this logic, the addiction (i.e., gambling disorder) 
reduces the proportion of knowledge in the game and increases the proportion of chance; therefore, they 
become more exposed to losing. Stemming from this cognition is the implicit belief that, had an addiction 
not set in, they would have been able to navigate the balance of knowledge versus chance, and produce 
consistent winnings. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Traces of such hypothesised model are evidenced in the manner participants describe their mental 
processing when betting and make sense of the role of addiction in it. Bettors appear to acknowledge a 
rational way of thinking and preparing for betting, navigating the odds while controlling for chance, and 
collecting the relevant information that could help them to make informed decisions. However, the causal 
connection between a meticulous, rational process of knowledge-based preparation and a successful 
prediction is broken by the irruption of a disorder, and addiction to gamble, that prevents them from 
acting rationally. In the following two examples, three bettors described how addiction turned their inner 




“There is a phase where you think your selections, but later you move on to a moment in which 
everything is about betting […] you bet because you need the adrenaline” (P41, 35 years). 
 
“In the morning, I’d take paper and a pen and do everything with calm and all that jazz. But 
later, the day used to drive me by impulse…” (P10, 28 years). Another participant interrupts: 
“Indeed. I used to begin the day by taking notes on my phone, upload my selections in an app, 
check the latest results… But later in the day (and depending on whether I also played roulette), 
if I lost, I’d go for short odds and end up losing it all” (P11, 20 years). 
 
The excerpts illustrate a three-phase process consisting of an initial rational phase, the progressive 
emergence of the addictive thirst through the day, and a final phase of loss of control. This way of 
interpreting their gambling past infers that, given the absence of a gambling disorder, betting could have 
been a lucrative endeavour, and that for those who do not suffer from it, beating bookmakers is possible. 
One of the findings during the re-coding process was the repeated use of the words ‘después’ or ‘luego’ – 
‘after’ and ‘later’, respectively − to mark the transition from knowledge-led and chance-avoidant patterns 
of deciphering probabilities to more risk-seeking, impulsive betting schemes. The importance of such 
word choice (15 uses of these words were identified) is not as relevant in relation to their 
acknowledgement of the negative impact of their addiction, as in their implicit recognition of a pre-
addiction state in which a fair and equal bettor–bookmaker relationship can realistically take place. 
Addiction came in later, so the errors in cognition that happened before were not inherently misguided. 
 
Barriers to integrating CBT learning with knowledge versus chance balance   
Participants in the study generally acknowledged the effects of CBT in neutralising long-held cognitions 
and beliefs about how gambling works. Most bettors considered they had overcome the effect of well-
known biases such as the gambler’s fallacy, or the internal attribution of winnings and the external 
attribution of losses. Bettors were not defensive about the role that chance played in their behaviour, and 
were happy to confirm their overestimation of knowledge. Nonetheless, their comments suggested that 
CBT only deactivated a portion of the cognitions and beliefs about sports betting. CBT’s cognitive 
restructuring was unable to neutralise more persistent forms of betting-related cognitions such as the ones 
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discussed in the previous section (i.e., the enhanced probability of winning in long-term betting, or the 
impact that their addiction had on the winning likelihood).  
 
Some bettors appeared to struggle to integrate into their pre-treatment understanding the lessons learned 
during CBT concerning the balance of knowledge versus chance. Participants expected that the 
development of the CBT would force them to question most of their pre-acquired ideas regarding 
gambling. In their minds, CBT should have reconfigured their cognitions to leave them thinking that 
sports betting is an activity purely based on chance wherein knowledge plays no significant part. 
However, when CBT failed to supply all the necessary answers to neutralise their preconceptions about 
the role of knowledge in sports betting, they fought to put back together a congruent narrative. One 
participant summed up the internal incongruences that bettors in recovery faced: 
 
“This [importance of knowledge in sports betting] is something I often think about. It’s inside me 
and I want to get rid of it. In fact, I want somebody to come here and show with documents that 
this is all pure chance… that’s what I want. Because I have this espinita (literally, little thorn) I 
want to get rid of. Researcher intervenes: The thing is that it’s not pure chance. Participant 
replies: I know it’s not only chance; it’s statistics” (P15, 23 years). 
 
This fragment synthesizes a key component of this participant’s internal conflict. The challenge of 
figuring out the balance between the roles of knowledge and chance in sports betting appears to be so 
damaging and frustrating, that this particular bettor looked to be relieved and escaped the logic of such 
balance by completely disregarding any role that knowledge might play in it. In his account, a sports 
betting entirely dominated by chance is presented as liberating and exculpatory. The recognition of a limit 
to his understanding, the espinita, represents the limit of CBT to fully account for his cognitions and 
beliefs about how sports betting works.  
 
Participants differed in the way they made sense of their cognitions concerning the role of knowledge in 
betting, citing several obstacles in their efforts to integrate them into the new cognitions fostered by 
therapy. Such obstacles were external, coming from society, the environment, significant others, and/or 
internal beliefs originated in themselves. One major external barrier for sports bettors in order to fully 
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harmonise their own cognitions and beliefs with the new cognitions and beliefs promoted in CBT was the 
perceived existence of other sports bettors who actually win money. Professional bettors or tipsters 
(bettors who run a subscription-based business in which they publish predictions for members), who in 
theory bet rationally and are rewarded with long-term profits, posed a challenge to bettors in recovery, 
reinforcing their cognitive schema that addiction was the deterrent between their knowledge and winning. 
In fact, a few participants revealed some forms of ideation about becoming professional bettors in the 
process of their addiction. The next excerpt, in which one participant showed what was likely to be a 
memory bias, aptly illuminates the predictive ability that bettors concede to professional tipsters. The 
fragment condenses how bettors see their addiction as coming in the way of a potentially lucrative betting 
path:  
 
“I had a tipster who gave me three tips a day… and I used to nail those tips, yes; but later I used 
to make many more bets of my own thinking and threw my money away” (P1, 27 years).  
 
Tipsters are not the only external stimuli that reminds bettors that there are individuals out there who 
prove that winning is viable. Participants reported marketing techniques in betting shops that included: (i) 
printed lists of winners hanging from a board, stating nickname and prize; and (ii) occasional reminders 
by betting shop workers of recent big winners. The portrayal of winners in advertisements on television, 
radio, and online also added to the general sentiment that some bettors experienced of missing something 
others were indeed experiencing. All these external reassurances were strengthened by a recent 
development: the sharing in social media of winning tickets as a bragging mechanism (particularly 
Twitter). Winning betting slips that are published online often depict high-risk small-stakes bets resulting 
in huge payoffs. On other occasions, the external validation of how important knowledge is, came from 
the nearest in the form of friends or co-workers.  
 
“I usually hear at work: with one euro I won a hundred. You always hear stories like this. 
Always about when they win, never about when they lose. That’s the taboo (P37, 39 years). 





When confronted about the selection bias involved in publishing the winning betting slips online (i.e., not 
publishing losing betting slips), and their own attention bias, bettors acknowledged such biases. It is 
especially telling the choice of the word taboo. A taboo is a prohibited or restricted social custom (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2018). This means that the necessity to validate and affirm the knowledge involved in 
betting prevents the depiction of a more realistic picture (composed of both losses and wins), with the in-
group exercising pressure to bias the true expression of betting outcomes.  
 
The difficulties in integrating new CBT-fostered cognitive styles not only found external barriers that 
continued to validate bettors’ old cognitive styles. Bettors also reported cognitions that could be construed 
as internal barriers. One of the most cited obstacles in realistically assessing the role knowledge had on 
their betting was their own record of wins and losses. Gamblers undergoing treatment were all affected by 
money losses, and without exception, saw themselves as incapable of profiting from gambling in the 
long-term. However, every participant recalled big wins and winning strikes. In these cases, where bettors 
used to favour low-risk predictions, they retained a consistent memory of winning more frequently than 
losing, although the sum of smaller amounts won on multiple occasions did not offset the bigger losses 
incurred on fewer occasions, resulting in a negative balance. Concealed in their remarks, a few sports 
bettors still wondered whatever could have happened in the event that their addiction never occurred. The 
influence these bettors attributed to knowledge was apparent in many ways, and made them struggle to 
fully internalise the idea that bookmakers profit from most gamblers in the long run by means of product 
design, and not because gamblers’ lack of knowledge. For instance, participants revealed inner conflicts 
when talking about other forms of wagering in which they thought to be less knowledgeable: 
 
“I used to bet a lot on greyhound and horse racing [...] I said to myself: “you’re retarded”, 
because I had made €300 from sports bets and wasted that money later on greyhounds. And I 
repeated to myself: don’t ever gamble again on greyhounds, stick to what you know [sports]” 
(P23, 24 years). 
 
In contrast to this perceived lack of knowledge about greyhound racing, this participant subtly 
acknowledged his sport knowledge to predict games. Similar vestiges of pride about an individual’s 
knowledge were observable in participants who marked the transition from rational betting to impulsive 
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betting in terms of losing the discipline of betting on sports they were familiar with and transitioning to 
unknown sports: “you think your knowledge will earn you money, but later on you lose control and start 
betting on teams you don’t know about…” (P36, 41 years). Such views provide an insight into the 
persistent thought of an internal locus of control over their bets. This thought was even more accentuated 
in those bettors with a past working in the sports industry. This was the case of two participants who were 
former football players, who confided how they thought their understanding of football would give them 
an edge over other casual bettors.  
 
General discussion 
The present paper examined how gamblers undergoing treatment for sports betting-related gambling 
disorder view their cognitions and beliefs about the role of knowledge in betting affects their recovery. 
The findings suggest persistent cognitions – unaffected by CBT cognitive restructuring – continue to 
operate in bettors’ minds. These cognitions appear to be associated with internal and external barriers that 
make it more difficult for bettors to reconcile their CBT-learned cognitions and beliefs with previously 
held ones.   
 
Some erroneous general cognitions about gambling appeared to be rapidly abandoned by gamblers in 
therapy while other more betting-related cognitions persisted. One possible explanation could be that 
knowledge-based cognitions are harder to extirpate. This interpretation is consistent with the national 
Norwegian study of gambling habits (Lund, 2011), where high frequency gamblers playing more chance-
based games (e.g., bingo cards, slot machines) showed more irrational thinking, perhaps because these 
games have structural characteristics that encourage superstitious thinking. Such superstitions were easier 
to remove by CBT. In contrast, knowledge-originated cognitions seem to appeal to a more rational side of 
the cognitive system, resulting in a more difficult reconfiguration. As opposed to other forms of 
gambling, bookmakers do not need to provide a skilful aspect for the game, because the bettors 
themselves can import from what they know about sports all the knowledge-based elements and try to 
apply them to betting. Bookmakers only need then to cater for those self-imported cognitions and amplify 
them. This strategy aligns well with the type of cognitive distortions promoted by bookmakers in their 
marketing and advertising stimuli (Lopez-Gonzalez, Estévez, & Griffiths, 2017), in which they accentuate 
the role of bettors in controlling the outcome of their bets, often by the use of technology (principally live 
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mobile technology). Such stimuli typically turn out to be the most profitable for bookmakers (Newall, 
2018).  
 
Specific sports betting-related cognitions about knowledge were not addressed by CBT in the studied 
sample. CBT for problem gamblers has typically considered gambling disorder as a single condition and 
treat it as such (Ladouceur et al., 2003). Despite the existence of numerous studies on the differences 
between gambling types and the prevalence of each in leading to problematic gambling (Bonnaire et al., 
2017; Calado & Griffiths, 2016; LaPlante, Nelson, LaBrie, & Shaffer, 2011; Wardle et al., 2011), 
gambling type is not generally considered a sufficiently relevant issue as to adapt CBT to specific groups 
of gamblers. Perhaps the psychological background of most professionals in CBT, combined with the 
current emphasis on the biological determinants of substance and behavioural addictions (Koob, 2006), 
has led to solely focusing upon the individual psychological factors involved. This could explain why 
gambling product-related factors, such as its design in the perception of the product in terms of its skill-
based characteristic and winning probability, have been largely ignored. These structural characteristics 
of gambling products (Parke & Griffiths, 2007) are bound to signify more in the near future as internet-
oriented aspects of gambling evolve (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 2018b), newer generations develop a need 
for more skill-based games, and the composition of the groups of help-seeking gamblers continues to 
become more heterogeneous (Hing et al., 2015). 
 
Theoretical implications 
Embedded in the findings of the present paper there are a number of theoretical implications to better 
understand how knowledge relates to significant barriers in treatment effectiveness. Figure 1 proposed a 
model to explain how sports bettors in recovery think their gambling disorder functions as a moderator 
between the balance of knowledge versus chance, and their ability to predict games. Here, the paper 
proposes a refined model (Figure 2), which departs from Figure 1 in one decisive manner. It posits that 
the balance of knowledge versus chance is (in reality) the superposition of two distinct balances: on the 
one hand; the balance between knowledge versus chance in sports competitions; and on the other hand, 
that same balance in sports betting products. In other words, sport contests are designed to provide an 
outcome based on the skills of contenders. The greater the skills, the greater the possibility of winning. 
Sports betting products are based on the prediction of such contests, but they possess their own design, 
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crafted by bookmakers. Odds and probabilities in betting product designs and sport contest designs are 
not identical. By theoretically unfolding this design, a number of internal and external obstacles surface. 
These obstacles make it difficult for bettors’ struggles to make full sense of how knowledge operates in 
sports betting.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
This model argues that bettors enter therapy with two sets of relevant cognitions. Namely, cognitions 
about how sport is designed (e.g., in soccer: what is a likely score, who is likely to receive a red card, 
what does the play of a winning team look like, etc.), and cognitions about how sports betting is designed 
(e.g., their winning systems, their evaluation of odds with perceived value, etc.). As with any other 
gambler, bettors expect therapy to deactivate their irrational cognitions about sports betting. However, 
unlike other gambling forms in which game designs are isolated from reality and only exist within their 
own set of rules, betting-based gambling only exists in relation to a reality that precedes (and in theory 
behaves independently from) betting practice. Results suggest that bettors in CBT eliminate many 
cognitions about gambling but retain some cognitions about sport. In processing these two sets of 
cognitions as a single one, bettors get confused and find it difficult to put together coherent narratives that 
explain how their persistent views on the role of knowledge in sports betting (which are in fact 
reminiscent of theirs views on the role of knowledge in sport as a whole) can be integrated into the 
learnings of CBT. This fight to reduce cognitive dissonance finds the external and internal barriers 
outlined in the findings section, which moderate how well they integrate the overall model. The external 
validation (e.g., tipsters, social media accounts of winners, advertising) makes it more difficult for bettors 
to align with gambling narratives proposed in CBT sessions. This generates internal incongruency when 
trying to internalise and harmonise all CBT teachings, sports betting design, sport contest design, and 
external validation itself. 
 
Limitations 
The theoretical models outlined here are purely based on qualitative data and have not been empirically 
validated previously. The present paper did not utilise established gambling cognition psychometric 
instruments, such as the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS) (Raylu & Oei, 2004). This fact, 
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combined with the self-reported nature of the collected data, could mean that the study is actually not 
assessing erroneous cognitions of sports bettors but ‘erroneous verbalizations’ (Toneatto et al., 1997, p. 
254), that is, errors in the linguistic explanation of their attribution of causal significance to events. The 
use of validated psychometric tools in future studies could prevent some of these problems, and provide a 
baseline understanding of sports bettors’ cognitions and beliefs prior to the study, from which to build a 
grounded theory.  
 
A proportion of the findings put forward in the present paper bear an important limitation regarding CBT. 
All the participants in the study were undergoing (or had just finished) CBT at the time of the study, but 
not all of them were in the same phase of the 3-5-month programme. There were differences in the level 
of commitment to the programme (i.e., some participants did not attend it on a weekly basis), the personal 
circumstances of each participant including the duration of their treatment, and the centre in which they 
were receiving it. Five of the six centres studied here had similar (but not identical) CBT protocols 
implemented by FEJAR, and another had a different protocol. This means that concluding that bettors 
retain persistent cognitions about the role of knowledge could have alternative explanations including that 
these cognitions (i) had been addressed in therapy but persisted; (ii) were unaddressed by therapy; (iii) 
were not addressed yet but could be in the remaining of CBT. After examining protocol documentation, 
the first alternative seems the most plausible, although considering the present study was not designed as 
a randomized trial experiment and lacks assessment tools to gauge therapeutic effects, this must remain 
open to interpretation.  
 
Conclusion 
In spite of its limitations, this qualitative study is the first to examine how sports bettors navigate the 
relevance that knowledge and chance have on their betting behaviour, and how they make sense of the 
role of knowledge in relation to their addiction to gambling. The study argues that bettors neutralise some 
gambling-related cognitive distortions during cognitive-behavioural therapy but retain others. These 
persistent cognitions pose a challenge for sports bettors, who try to eliminate them but encounter external 
validation to keep them and internal incongruences to integrate them into a coherent understanding of 
how gambling works. The study further argues that both sports as a contest and sports betting as a 
gambling product embody a balance between knowledge and chance. This balance is similar in both 
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sports and sports betting product designs but not identical. Consequently, this confuses sports bettors in 
their efforts to calibrate the positive impact their own skills and knowledge might have. Finally, it argues 
that these cognitions are a fertile terrain for bettors to think that their problem (i.e., gambling disorder) is 
the thing that interposed between their knowledge of sports/sports betting and their ability to predict game 
outcomes, and had it not manifested, they might have remained successful bettors.  
 
These results have serious implications for professionals in gambling treatment, and highlights the 
specificity of gamblers who engage in mostly skill-based games. It also pinpoints the specificity of sports 
betting in that it conflates in gamblers’ minds their cognitions and beliefs about gambling, but also about 
sports, and signals the importance of addressing both facets to help gamblers in recovery to harmoniously 
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